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Abstract. This article describes the psychological benefits of an offensive biological warfare program. 
 
Offensive biological warfare (BW) assets--as with all military assets--are intended to help achieve 
political objectives. This is the case whether the assets comprise research and development 
technologies for BW agents and delivery mechanisms, the stockpiling and/or deployment of agents and 
delivery mechanisms, operational BW planning capabilities, or the employment of BW agents. 
Irrespective of the physical consequences of BW agent employment, an offensive BW program--defined 
as engaging in any combination of the above--may be considered a variant of psychological warfare with 
the following benefits for its purveyor--whether nation-state or other political entity. 
 
(1) A political entity can upgrade its comparative political power through an offensive BW program. 
Merely through others' knowledge of the program's existence, political objectives may be more easily 
obtained. (The same, of course, is the case for terrorism, other weapons of mass destruction, and 
significant amounts of exploitable natural resources from strategic minerals to agricultural 
commodities.) (2) A political entity may engage in negotiations to receive grants, loans, credits, and non-
BW materiel in exchange for promising the termination of its offensive BW program. The entity may also 
agree to inspections varying in degree of comprehensiveness, obtrusiveness, and reactiveness. Given 
the extreme difficulty in verifying the absence of an offensive BW program, the entity may end up with 
the best of both worlds: aid and a program. (3) The very threat of possible BW employment can have 
significant adverse effects on a potential military adversary that otherwise seems militarily superior. 
These effects include the (a) expense of research, development, purchasing, and fielding defensive BW 
immunizations, antidotes, protective equipment, and operational procedures; (b) the performance 
decrements caused by defensive BW practices when attempting to carry out necessary duties; and (c) 
stress, social cohesion, and moral shortfalls related to the idiosyncratic meanings that military personnel 
ascribe to BW--especially related to narcissistic wounding and psychological boundaries between self 
and other. (4) The threat of BW employment against an adversary's civilians and "home turf" can also 
foster the costs described in (3) as well as a myriad of decrements to a population's preferred life style, 
law and order, gross national product, and political stability. (5) An offensive BW program can serve as a 
significant deterrent against an adversary's military intervention. (6) A political entity may not possess 
any BW assets but may engage in disinformation programs to garner the benefits of being perceived to 
possess such assets. 
 
There is a seventh and especially salient psychological benefit. Increasing globalization is facilitating the 
invasion of traditional cultures and values with mass commercialism and crass materialism and is easing 
the transport of products across borders. These two phenomena make BW an ever more attractive 
weapon against those perceived to represent the destroyers of one's psychological--viz., religious and 
ideological, integrity. The apocalyptic and eschatological notion of ending life as we know it with agents 
of life is one that the technology and progress enamored may find difficult to apperceive--as long as 
they're alive. (See Altman, L.K. (March 11, 1998). Smallpox vaccine urged to prepare for terrorist attacks. 
The New York Times, (http://www.nytimes.com); Preston, R. (March 9, 1998.) Annals of warfare: The 
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bioweaponeers. The New Yorker, pp. 52-65; Rhode, E. (1997). Does mind have boundaries in the way 
that body does? Journal of Melanie Klein and Object Relations, 15, 77-89.) (Keywords: Biological 
Warfare, Psychological Warfare.) 
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